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Early modern philosophers, nearly without exception, believe that 
causes necessitate their effects. If the cause exists or occurs, then the 
effect must also exist or occur. This “must” is understood by the early 
moderns in the strongest possible sense. There are absolutely no pos-
sible circumstances, they believe, in which the cause exists or occurs 
but the effect does not. We could say that, according to the early mod-
erns, the sense of necessity with which causes necessitate their effects is 
absolute or logical necessity. This is the opinion of Hobbes,1 Descartes,2 
Locke,3 Malebranche,4 Spinoza, and, I will argue, Leibniz. Even Hume, 
who denied that the causal relation is a necessary connection, assumed 
1 Hobbes 2011, II.9.3.
2 AT 7:70/CSM 2:48. I am here relying upon the reading of this text according to which the argu-
ment presupposes that causal connections are absolutely necessary sound; see Sleigh 1990, 176.
3 Locke 1975, IV.iii.25, 556.
4 OCM 2:316/LO 450.
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that, if it were, it would be absolutely or logically necessary.5 That they 
thought so has struck many as mysterious.6 It might seem mysterious 
to a contemporary philosopher because we are accustomed to seeing 
causation not as a relation of absolute necessity but of dependence, or 
probability raising, or some kind of necessity weaker than absolute. 
And even the historically informed philosopher who conscientiously 
endeavors to resist anachronism has reason to be surprised. The medi-
evals typically thought that causal necessity was weaker than logical or 
absolute necessity, so there was a historical precedent for understand-
ing causal necessity as a kind of necessity weaker than logical or abso-
lute necessity. Why did the early moderns think otherwise?
Before approaching this question, it will be worthwhile to consider 
the reasons why many philosophers have thought that causal connec-
tions are not absolutely necessary. There are at least four reasons for think-
ing so: (1) causes depend on background conditions, (2) causation is 
probabilistic, (3) the laws of nature are not necessary, and (4) miracles. 
Let us briefly consider each of these reasons.
DEPENDENCE: Causes appear to depend on background condi-
tions. Striking the match ignited it. But it wouldn’t have in a vacuum. 
That there is oxygen in the environment is a background condition 
upon which the causal connection depends. Because this condition is 
merely contingent, there are possible circumstances in which the strik-
ing doesn’t ignite the match. Thus, there is no necessary connection 
between the striking and the ignition. If the match hadn’t been struck, 
however, the match would not have ignited. The ignition depends on 
the striking, although it is not necessitated by it. For this reason, many 
philosophers have concluded that causation is a relation of dependence 
but not necessity. “Dependence” thus has a double meaning in this 
context. First, causes depend on their background conditions. Conse-
quently, effects merely depend on their causes.
5 Hume 1978, 168. See Chapter 8 in this volume for more on Hume’s account of causation.
6 Such puzzlement is registered by Steven Nadler, for example, in Nadler 1996.
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PROBABILISTIC CAUSATION: We could insist that the total 
or complete cause necessitates and the striking was merely a partial 
cause. On this view, the total cause includes what are, perhaps for 
pragmatic reasons, pushed into the so-called background condi-
tions. Even so, there is reason to doubt that the laws that govern the 
evolution of the world are deterministic. If the fundamental laws 
are genuinely probabilistic, then causes can necessitate nothing more 
than probability distributions. Paradigmatic effects are not them-
selves probability distributions. Rather it is possible effects over which 
probabilities are distributed. Thus, such effects themselves are not ne-
cessitated.
CONTINGENT LAWS: If a contemporary philosopher still be-
lieves, despite these considerations, that causes necessitate their effects, 
she likely also believes that the kind of necessity involved is something 
far short of logical or absolute necessity. The force, energy, or power 
encompassed by a given state of the world necessitates its future states, 
but not with the same strength that the premises of a logically valid 
argument entail its conclusion. For example, the direction that these 
powers or forces push the world depends upon the laws of nature. 
These laws, many believe, are themselves contingent. We can, it is al-
leged, conceive of the world as governed by different laws. We can, or 
so Hume insisted, conceive of bread failing to nourish a man.7 We 
might be inclined, therefore, to identify causal necessity with natural 
necessity. Translated into the idiom of possible worlds, we could say 
that causes necessitate their effects in the sense that, in every world in 
which the laws are as they are in the actual world, the effect follows the 
cause.
MIRACLES: Earlier philosophers had other reasons for doubting 
that causation is an absolutely or logically necessary connection. The 
medievals often believed that the natural powers of creatures could be 
7 Hume 1999, §4.
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overridden by the miraculous intervention of God.8 The striking of the 
match naturally causes it to ignite, but a miracle could block this nat-
ural consequence. Hence, it is not absolutely or logically necessary that 
the striking causes the ignition.
Against this backdrop, the prevalence of the view that causes abso-
lutely necessitate their effects in the early modern period is surprising. 
We are unaccustomed to regard the causal relation as absolutely neces-
sary, conditioned as we are by the arguments of more recent philoso-
phers to the contrary. And there were already historical precedents 
that should have alerted the early moderns to the possibility that causal 
necessity is not absolute. Once the option of less than absolute causal 
necessity is on the table, how could a reasonable philosopher think 
otherwise?
I will not attempt a completely general answer to this question here. 
Instead I will focus on just two philosophers, Spinoza and Leibniz. Al-
though it is far more obvious in the case of Spinoza than Leibniz, I will 
argue that both philosophers hold that causal necessity is absolute. I will 
attempt further to find the reasons that stand behind their conviction. It 
is reasonable to hope that once we understand the reasons why these two 
philosophers believed that causal necessity is absolute, we will have a 
better idea of why the idea was so widespread in the period. I am afraid, 
however, that I must confess from the outset that some of my conclu-
sions will be disappointing. I will argue that the reasons of Spinoza and 
Leibniz do not generalize, and so much of the mystery is left unsolved.
Before proceeding, it will be useful to say a few words about kinds 
of necessity: logical, metaphysical, absolute, natural, causal, and so on. 
If we are to answer the questions under discussion in this chapter, then 
we need to have some clarity on the notion of kinds of necessity. Kinds 
8 See, for example, Thomas Aquinas 1932–34, Qu. 1, art. 3–5. Walter Ott argues that it is a mistake to 
read the medievals as holding that causal necessity is not absolute, because he thinks that miracles in-
volve a withdrawal of divine concurrence, which is a condition for causation (see Ott  2009). The 
above-cited text of Aquinas, however, does not contain a discussion of divine concurrence, which 
would be surprising if it were the key to his thought on miracles. So, at least some medievals did not 
see the situation as Ott describes it.
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of necessity can be thought of as what is necessary provided that some 
condition is met. Natural necessity, for example, is sometimes thought 
of as what is necessary given that the actual laws of nature hold. Causal 
necessity would then be what is necessary given that the actual features 
that ground causation hold. Whether or not causal and natural neces-
sity are the same turns on whether or not the laws of nature are all the 
features that ground causation.
1. Spinoza
The notion of causation plays a central role in Spinoza’s philosophy. He 
claims that God is self-caused as well as the efficient cause of both the 
essences and existence of his creatures. He says that God is the cause of 
himself in the same sense that he is the cause of his creatures, and so he 
is the efficient cause of himself. He also says that the causal powers of 
finite things are rooted in a striving for self-preservation. And, perhaps 
most famously, he launches a ferocious attack on the notion of divine 
providence and the notion of final causation that it involves.9 How 
does Spinoza understand causation? In particular, how does he under-
stand causal necessity? I will begin by presenting the textual evidence 
to support the view that Spinoza thought that causal necessity was ab-
solute. Next, I will consider the question of why Spinoza believes that 
causal necessity is absolute by first exploring some promising but ulti-
mately failed attempts to explain it, and then by presenting my own 
solution. Finally, I will argue that the considerations that lead other 
philosophers to deny that causal necessity is absolute would not move 
Spinoza due to his larger philosophical commitments.
The textual evidence that Spinoza thought that causal necessity is 
absolute is unequivocal. In 1a3 of his Ethics, Spinoza writes: “From a 
9 Whether or not Spinoza rejects all final causation is a controversial issue. Some commentators, 
most notably Don Garrett, have argued that Spinoza’s conatus doctrine is teleological and hence that 
Spinoza anticipates Leibniz in reintroducing final causation into early modern metaphysics. See 
Garrett 1999.
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given determinate cause the effect follows necessarily; and conversely, 
if there is no determinate cause, it is impossible for an effect to follow.”10 
This indicates that Spinoza views causation as a necessary connection, 
but it leaves unspecified the strength of the necessity involved. Other 
texts, however, show that Spinoza thinks that the kind of necessity in-
volved is absolute or logical. In 1p16 Spinoza glides from the claim that 
from the definition of God follows infinitely many things to the claim 
that God is the efficient cause of infinitely many things. Nothing pre-
pares us for this transition, and he presents it without argument as if it 
ought to be obvious. What is more, in the scholium to the very next 
proposition, he directly compares the necessity of God’s efficient cau-
sality to logical or mathematical necessity. There he claims that it 
would be equally absurd if God could bring it about that the interior 
angles of a triangle are not equal to two right angles and if God could 
bring it about that an effect didn’t follow from a given cause. It is 
striking that he characterizes the scenario in which an effect wouldn’t 
follow from its cause as absurd. This suggests that Spinoza would regard 
such failure as not merely contrary to nature, but also contrary to reason. 
And he explicitly asserts that the kind of necessity involved in causal 
relations is the very same kind as is involved in logical or mathematical 
relations. We can see plainly that Spinoza believed that causal necessity 
is logical necessity. But why did he believe this?
Perhaps the answer can be found in Spinoza’s causal criteria for good 
definitions. Spinoza thinks that good definitions must include, in case 
of created things, the proximate causes of a thing.11 He also thinks that 
good definitions are such that we can deduce all of the definiendum’s 
properties from its definition.12 He goes on to offer a similar treatment 
of the definitions of uncreated things (presumably what he will call 
10 Does Spinoza here mean to restrict the axiom to “determinate” causes? Are there indeterminate 
causes to which the axiom applies? I am not aware of any evidence that Spinoza believes the bizarre 
proposition that there are indeterminate things. I read the axiom as meaning that from a specific cause 
a specific effect follows.
11 TEdI 96, G 2:35/CWS 40.
12 G 2:35/CWS 40.
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“self-caused” things in the Ethics.) The relevant conditions on such 
things are:
That it should exclude every cause, that is, that the object should 
require nothing else except its own being for its explanation [ . . . ] Fi-
nally (though it is not very necessary to note this) it is required that 
all its properties be inferred from its definition. (TEdI 97, G 2:35 / 
CWS 40)
In these texts we find Spinoza relating definitions to causes in two 
ways. First, if a thing is created, then its definition must specify its 
causes. This establishes a necessary connection between cause and 
effect. Indeed, it specifies an absolutely necessary connection between 
cause and effect. If, for example, it is part of the definition of human 
beings that they are produced by other human beings, then it is no 
more possible that a human being come from nonhuman animals or 
from the swamp than that a bachelor could be married.
But there are two difficulties with this explanation of Spinoza’s 
views. First, the necessity runs from effect to cause. If the cause is part 
of the definition of the effect, then the definition of the effect entails or 
necessitates the cause rather than the cause necessitating the effect. 
Second, this condition is compatible with causes that don’t necessi-
tate.13 For example, suppose a thing is the result of a probabilistic cause. 
Then, according to Spinoza, the cause must be included in the defini-
tion. It is thus true by definition that the definiendum has this cause 
and, indeed, it would be an absolutely necessary truth that the defini-
endum has this cause. But, for all this, the cause did not absolutely ne-
cessitate the effect. For this reason, the condition that definitions must 
include causes is not relevant to understanding Spinoza’s remarks in 
E1p16c1 and E1p17s, where Spinoza is clearly discussing an entailment 
from causes to effects.
13 I am indebted for this point to John Morrison.
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The other condition that Spinoza lays down for definitions is that a 
proper definition is such that all the properties of the definiendum can 
be inferred from it. This condition makes no explicit reference to cau-
sation. It does, however, resonate with Spinoza’s defense of the claim 
that from the divine nature infinitely many things follow, in which he 
asserts that the intellect infers the properties of a thing from its defini-
tion (E2p16d, G 2:104/CWS 463) and from which he concludes that 
God is the efficient cause of all things (E1p16c1, G 2:60/CWS 425). 
“Things following from a nature” appears to be identified with “prop-
erties following from a definition.” And both are compared to effects 
following from an efficient cause.
The first puzzle that must be addressed here is why Spinoza identi-
fies things following from a nature with properties following from a 
definition. The connection between natures and definitions is clear 
enough. It’s common to think of a real definition as what specifies a 
nature or essence. The more puzzling issue is why Spinoza identifies 
things with properties. Is this not a conflation of metaphysical catego-
ries? This identification will seem less odd if we are mindful of Spino-
za’s own somewhat idiosyncratic account of the basic metaphysical 
categories. For him, the central categories are substance, attribute, and 
mode. Modes are both particular things (although not substances) and 
ways that a substance exemplifies an attribute. In other words, they are 
substances insofar as the substance in which they inhere exemplifies 
some property. In this sense, a fist is a mode of a hand: a fist is a hand 
insofar as it is closed. As such they are, in some sense, adjectival on sub-
stance. And so they cut across the categories of property and things. 
The things that follow from the divine nature and the properties that 
follow from God’s essence are, in both cases, the modes of God or the 
ways that God exemplifies his attributes.
But is there a connection between properties or modes following 
from the definition of a thing and the causal relations into which a 
thing enters? There is one obvious way that there could be such a con-
nection. If all of the properties of a thing follow from its definition, 
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then all of the properties that relate to its causal relations follow from 
it. For example, Brutus killed Caesar. So Brutus has the property of 
killing Caesar. Thus the property of killing Caesar follows from 
Brutus’ definition. But would Spinoza regard being such as to kill 
Caesar as a property of Brutus? Contemporary philosophers often 
think of properties as cheap and abundant, sometimes identifying 
them with sets, but early moderns typically did not. Instead, they 
thought of properties as metaphysically robust: properties are real 
constituents of objects. That Spinoza shares this opinion can be seen 
from the fact that in E1p16d he identifies properties with modes. 
Mode is one of the ontological categories. So properties are in his fun-
damental ontology. Contrasts this with sets. Sets, even among those 
who believe in them, are not typically thought to be part of the world’s 
fundamental ontology. They are supervenient beings. They require no 
special act of creation.
I suspect that Spinoza would not regard a putative property like 
being such as to kill Brutus as a genuine property. Spinoza, like many 
seventeenth-century philosophers, classifies relations as beings of reason 
(KV X, G 1:49/CWS 92). We cannot turn a being of reason into a real 
entity simply by saturating an argument place. That is, we cannot turn 
a mere being of reason like the relation x kills y into a metaphysically 
robust property by replacing y with Brutus.
What does explain Spinoza’s belief that causes necessitate their ef-
fects in an absolute or logical sense? It is very difficult to say. The claim 
that causes necessitate their effects is introduced in the Ethics without 
argument as an axiom: “From a given determinate cause the effect fol-
lows necessarily; and conversely, if there is no determinate cause, it is 
impossible for an effect to follow” (EIa3, G 2:46/CWS 410). He does 
not explicitly consider the question later in the Ethics or in any other 
work. Indeed, one might conclude from its status as an axiom that Spi-
noza regards it as basic. But the inclusion of a claim among the axioms 
of the Ethics does not mean that Spinoza thinks that it is impossible to 
provide a deeper foundation for it. He regards EIp7, for example, as 
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axiomatic and yet he presumes to give an argument for it. So, it is not 
illegitimate by Spinoza’s lights to ask about the deeper intellectual 
foundation for something introduced as an axiom. I conjecture that if 
there is a deeper basis for Spinoza’s belief that causes absolutely neces-
sitate their effects, it can be found in his commitment to the Principle 
of Sufficient Reason (PSR). The PSR says that there is a sufficient 
reason for everything. Sufficient reasons necessitate the things they ex-
plain. If x is sufficient for y, then there are no possible circumstances in 
which x occurs but not y. That is, x necessitates y. The specific version 
of the PSR that Spinoza endorses says that each thing has a cause or 
reason (causa sive ratio) (EIp11d, G 2:53/CWS 417-18). Sive means “or” 
in the sense of “or in other words.” So the demand for a reason is tanta-
mount to a demand for a cause. Sufficient reasons are sufficient causes. 
So causes must necessitate. I know of no text where Spinoza explicitly 
reasons in this way, but he is committed to the PSR, and the PSR is 
very congenial to the idea that causes necessitate.
This interpretation finds some confirmation when we consider why 
Spinoza would not be moved by the considerations that lead other phi-
losophers to either reject causation as a necessary relation or to insist 
that causal necessity is weaker than absolute necessity. I will argue that 
in each case, Spinoza’s commitment to the PSR would lead him to dis-
count these considerations. Recall that among contemporary philoso-
phers, the denial that causation is a necessary connection of any sort, 
let alone an absolute or necessary connection, is encouraged by two fac-
tors: DEPENDENCE: the observation that causes are dependent on 
background conditions, which can vary; and PROBABILISTIC CAU-
SATION: the idea that the fundamental laws of nature might be proba-
bilistic. A third factor, CONTINGENT LAWS, leads philosophers to 
believe that even if causation is a necessary connection, it is not an abso-
lutely necessary connection because the laws of nature are not absolutely 
necessary. Among Spinoza’s medieval predecessors, the idea that causes do 
not absolutely or logically necessitate their effects was promoted by MIR-
ACLES: the belief that God could defeat the natural causal powers of 
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things by means of a miracle. None of these factors have any role in 
Spinoza’s philosophy due principally to his commitment to the PSR.
Consider first DEPENDENCE. The striking of the match caused it 
to ignite. The ignition depends on the striking but it isn’t necessitated 
by it since the ignition wouldn’t have occurred if there had been no 
oxygen. In other words, effects depend on their causes but aren’t ne-
cessitated by them. But this picture is incompatible with the PSR. 
There is, according to the PSR, a sufficient reason for everything, and 
Spinoza treats “reason” as synonymous with “cause” in texts where the 
PSR is under discussion (EIp11d, G 2:52-53/CWS 417-18). So causes 
must be sufficient for their effects. This is incompatible with the idea 
that causes operate in the context of background conditions, because 
only the causes in conjunction with the background conditions are suf-
ficient for the effects. The main alternative to thinking that causes op-
erate in the context of background conditions is to see the alleged 
cause as merely a partial cause and the alleged background conditions 
as partial causes in their own right. So, in our example, the striking isn’t 
the cause of the ignition. It is a cause or a partial cause. And so are the 
presence of oxygen, etc. Spinoza speaks of partial causes but not back-
ground conditions.14 So presumably he would regard the striking of 
the match as merely a partial cause. The total cause would be the strik-
ing in conjunction with the so-called background conditions. And this 
total cause would be sufficient for the ignition. This fits well with his 
commitment to the PSR, which requires causes or reasons to be suffi-
cient for their explananda.
Spinoza’s commitment to the PSR would also lead him to deny PROB-
ABILISTIC CAUSATION. Suppose there is an atom of uranium that 
decays at time t. Suppose further that the laws that govern the decay of 
atoms of uranium are probabilistic. That is, the law determines only a prob-
ability distribution for the time of the decay. For example, the law assigns a 
probability p to the decay of the atom at t given the initial conditions. 
14 See EIIIpd1, IIId2, IIIp1, and IVp2.
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So the initial conditions and the laws are not jointly a sufficient reason 
for the decay. There are possible circumstances in which the initial con-
ditions and laws are what they are but the atom does not decay at t. But 
this possibility contradicts the PSR, to which Spinoza is committed. 
For this reason, Spinoza’s world must be strictly deterministic.
Spinoza’s commitment to the PSR also leads him to deny CON-
TINGENT LAWS. Spinoza speaks frequently of laws of nature, which 
he appears to identify with what he calls the “laws of God's nature.”15 
Moreover, he sometimes identifies the laws of God’s own nature with “the 
necessity of the divine nature” (E Ip17d, G 2:61/CWS 425), and some-
times says that the laws of nature “follow from necessity and perfection of 
the divine nature” (TTP 6.7). Both formulations strongly suggest that the 
laws are necessary. Such necessity is congenial to the PSR. If the laws were 
contingent, there would have to be a contingent cause or reason why they 
were one way rather than another. Perhaps they are ordained by God’s 
will. But if God’s will is contingent, what could be the sufficient reason for 
it? By identifying the laws of nature with the necessity of God’s nature, 
Spinoza forecloses such worrying questions.
Spinoza also denies MIRACLES because he doesn’t think that any-
thing, including miracles, violates the natural order. (TTP 6.7). Spi-
noza affirms that God does everything by the necessity of his own 
nature. If God were to perform a miracle that violates the natural order, 
then something would follow from God’s nature that contradicts 
something that follows from his nature. On the assumption that God’s 
nature is coherent, this is impossible. It is not hard to discern the appeal 
of these views to someone who holds the PSR. Suppose that there are 
miracles. These cannot follow from God’s absolute nature, since other-
wise they would be always and everywhere. The most natural alter-
native is that they follow from God’s free decisions. Then, of course, 
Spinoza would have to give up his identification of the divine intellect 
with the divine will. And so the divine will would require a sufficient 
15 See EIp15, Ip17, Ip17d, appendix to part 1, the preface to part III, IIIp2d.
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reason. It is very hard to see what such a reason could be without com-
promising divine freedom. By denying the possibility of miracles, the 
adherent to the PSR avoids all of these awkward questions.
2. Leibniz
As it does in Spinoza’s, the notion of causation plays a central role in 
the philosophy of Leibniz. In particular, Leibniz thinks that the new 
philosophy of the seventeenth century has been too quick to discard 
the substantial forms of the Aristotelians. He thinks this because he 
believes that substances, the basic entities that constitute the funda-
mental level of reality, must be causally active, and that it is impossible 
to explain causal activity without recourse to something analogous 
to substantial forms. Given this picture, there is a question regarding 
the way different varieties of causation (efficient, final, and formal) fit 
together. I will largely ignore these questions. I will mainly speak of cau-
sation generically. If the variety of causation matters, I will take efficient 
causation to be the default example.
The plan of this section will be as follows. First, I will review some of 
the main points of Leibniz’s views on causation. Next, I will argue that 
although some commentators, such as Robert Sleigh,16 have argued 
that Leibniz does not think that causal necessity is absolute, Leibniz is 
committed to this thesis by some of his views about causation and mo-
dality. I will then offer textual evidence that Leibniz is aware of this 
commitment and accepts it. I will next explain why the considerations 
that have led other philosophers to deny this would not move Leibniz, 
paying special attention to the difficult issue of miracles.
But before dealing directly with question of causal necessity, it 
will be worthwhile to first articulate some basic features of Leib-
niz’s thoughts about causality. This will provide the context for what 
comes next.
16 Sleigh 1990, 171. This is also, as I read her, Margaret Wilson’s position in Wilson 1994.
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One of the main themes of Leibniz’s philosophy is the need for the 
rehabilitation of substantial forms.17 Mechanical philosophers of the 
seventeenth century had tended to disparage substantial forms as mys-
terious and attempted to explain natural changes by reference to size, 
shape, and motion alone. Leibniz thought that size, shape, and motion 
cannot explain change, and that something like force must be added 
to the mix.18 Force, Leibniz thought, is like an internal principle of 
change, and so akin to the substantial forms of the scholastics. He does 
not view this internal principle as merely a formal cause, but also as an 
efficient cause, and he describes the essence of a substance as its primi-
tive active force. The primitive active force is what causes the changes 
in a substance. Also relevant to the changes that a substance undergoes 
are its accidents: its perceptions and appetitions. Perceptions are the 
qualities that inhere in a substance. Appetitions are the way that prim-
itive active force is manifested in the context of the perceptions of a 
substance.19 In other words, a substance changes over time in virtue of 
its perceptions and the appetitions that push it from one state to the 
next. These are the only effects produced by a finite substance. Such 
substances do not causally interact with each other. The appearance of 
interaction is produced, rather, by a preestablished harmony preor-
dained by God, which ensures that all of a substances self-caused 
changes appropriately correlate with the changes self-caused by every 
other finite substance.
Since our topic is the necessity of the causal relation, we would do 
well to examine Leibniz’s thoughts on necessity itself. Leibniz has dis-
tinctive views about the analysis of necessity. One way to begin our 
inquiry is to try to formulate the issue of the necessity of the causal re-
lation in terms of Leibniz’s analysis of necessity. As is well known, 
Leibniz has two main accounts of necessity. The most famous is the 
17 DM 10, G 4:434–35/AG 42; A New System of Nature, G 4:478–79/AG 139; On Nature Itself, G 
4:511/AG 162. For an excellent treatment of this issue, see Garber 2009, chs. 3 and 4.
18 A Specium of Dynamics, GM 6:236/AG 119; A New System of Nature, G 4:510–12/AG 161–63.
19 Mon 15, G 6:609.
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account according to which a truth is necessary just in case it can be 
demonstrated by analysis in a finite number of steps.20 This is an ac-
count of the necessity of truths and not an account of the necessity of 
a relation between states or events. But it is natural to think the neces-
sity of such a relation can be represented by a necessary conditional 
proposition. For example, if striking a match causes it to ignite and 
causation is a necessary connection, then it is true that, necessarily, if 
the match is struck, then it ignites. So, if causes necessitate in an abso-
lute or logical sense of necessity, then the truth of the conditional “If 
the match is struck, then it ignites” can be demonstrated by analysis in 
a finite number of steps.
Would Leibniz think that such causal statements can be so ana-
lyzed? It is exceedingly difficult to say. Leibniz’s discussions of neces-
sary truths typically presume that such truths have subject-predicate 
form but, on at least one occasion, Leibniz tries to extend this account 
to conditional statements by maintaining that a conditional is true if 
the consequent is contained in the antecedent.21 It is not entirely clear 
how to construe this. This containment relation is presumably the very 
thing that analysis is supposed to reveal. Unfortunately, what Leibniz 
says about analysis is extremely sketchy and metaphorical.22 Rather 
than speculating on these matters, I propose that we instead investigate 
Leibniz’s other main analysis of necessity.
In addition to analyzing necessity in terms of demonstrability by 
 analysis, Leibniz also analyzes in terms of essentiality. Although it is less 
famous than the analysis in terms of infinite analysis, many commenta-
tors regard the doctrine of per se necessity as one of Leibniz’s most 
cherished and firmly held doctrines.23 According to this account of 
20 On Contingency, A VI.iv.1650/AG 28.
21 C 401.
22 For a sample of the wide varieties of interpretation of Leibnizian analysis see Adams 1994, 25f; 
Carriero 1993.
23 See for example, Adams 1994, 12, and Lin 2011. For a dissenting view, see Sleigh’s editorial com-
ments in Leibniz 2005, 272f.
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 necessity, a substance is necessarily F just in case it is essentially F.24 
Leibniz sometimes calls this per se necessity, and suggests that per 
se necessity is the most basic and familiar modal notion. That is, per se 
necessity is not a special variety of necessity. It is necessity in an un-
qualified sense.
Per se necessity is analyzed in terms of essences. What are essences 
for Leibniz? If the analysis of necessity in terms of essence is to suc-
ceed, Leibniz must not be interpreted as a superessentialist, according 
to whom all of a thing’s properties are essential to it. Rather, a mean-
ingful distinction between essence and accident must be assumed. I 
have argued elsewhere that essences, for Leibniz, exclude all informa-
tion about other substances (see Lin 2011). The terminology of per se 
necessity suggests as much, and Leibniz also says that the essences of 
things give us no basis for a comparison with other things (Gr 289). If 
a substance contained information about other substances, it is diffi-
cult to see how they could fail to be a basis for comparing things.
Now Leibniz often speaks as though the relata of causation are sub-
stances. If this so, then we should conclude that the causal relation is 
not per se necessary, because causation relates substances, and the es-
sence of a substance doesn’t point to any substances outside of it. But 
remember that Leibniz thinks that all genuine causation takes place 
within a substance. Substances are the causes of their own future states. 
So the essence of a substance does not have to point outside of itself in 
order for a substance to be essentially (and hence necessarily) con-
nected to its effects. Causation would be instead a relation that relates 
substances to themselves. What is more, Leibniz’s considered view 
cannot be that the relata of causation are substances tout court. He 
often says that perceptions are involved in causation. Perceptions are 
not substances, but rather qualities or states of a substance. Moreover, 
substances are causes in virtue of their primitive active power. Leibniz 
writes: “Perception is the operation proper to the soul, and the nexus 
24 A VI.iii.28; Leibniz 2005, 55.
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of perceptions, according to which subsequent ones are derived from 
the preceding ones” (GP 2:372/L 599). It would probably be more ac-
curate to say that, for Leibniz, the relata of causation are substances in 
so far as they have certain essences and possess certain perceptions. An-
other way of putting this would be to say that the relata of causation are 
modes of a substance or substances insofar as they are a certain way 
(have a certain essence and have certain perceptions). Since the causal 
relation only relates modes of a substance to modes of the same sub-
stance, all true causal statements will have the form x insofar as it is F 
causes x insofar as it is G. The question of the necessity of such causal 
statements will be determined by whether or not it is essential to x that 
insofar as it is F it causes itself insofar as it is G.
I think that we can see that, for Leibniz, if a substance insofar as it is 
F causes itself insofar as it is G, then it does so essentially. This is en-
tailed by Leibniz’s conception of essence or nature as primitive active 
force, that is, as the ultimate explanation of why a substance undergoes 
the changes that it does. Explaining why a substance insofar as it is F 
becomes a substance insofar as it is G is the very role for a rehabilitated 
notion of substantial form that Leibniz thinks is so indispensable. So, 
on Leibniz’s account of per se necessity, the causal relation will be an 
absolutely or logically necessary connection.
In the previous section, we saw that Spinoza denies that God has 
free will. This denial both allows him to resist the conclusion that 
causes do not absolutely necessitate their effects and stems from his 
commitment to the PSR. It is worth noting that Leibniz’s analysis of 
necessity in terms of essence allows him to hold the PSR while still 
maintaining that God and other rational creatures have free will. 
Leibniz holds that free action has three conditions: (1) contingency, 
(2) intelligence, and (3) spontaneity (T 173). An action is sponta-
neous just in case it has its causal source from within the agent. A free 
agent is not compelled by external forces. An action is intelligent just 
in case the agent has considered possible alternatives and selected the 
actual action on account of judging that it is the best. Of course, an 
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agent cannot consider alternative possibilities unless there are alterna-
tive possibilities. And so intelligence is impossible without contin-
gency. Contingency is needed to secure alternatives over which the 
agent can deliberate. Suppose that Brutus freely murders Caesar. 
Brutus freely murders Caesar only if he deliberates over alternative 
actions and selects murdering Caesar from those alternatives on ac-
count of judging it to be the best alternative. So, that Brutus murders 
Caesar must not be necessary. That is, according to the per se possi-
bility account of modality, Brutus must not essentially murder Caesar. 
But this is compatible with a state of Brutus, say the state that is the 
output of his deliberations, necessitating that Brutus murders Caesar. 
That is, it might be that Brutus essentially murders Caesar on the con-
dition that he is in that state, although Brutus does not essentially 
murder Caesar.
To be sure, Leibniz often says that reasons incline without necessi-
tating and that the free acts of a free agent are only morally necessary 
(DM 13), but I believe that such locutions as “inclines without neces-
sitating” and “moral necessity” are ways that Leibniz talks about states 
that are the outcome of intelligent deliberation.25 Such states are 
merely contingent because they are not essential to the substance in 
which they inhere, but they are hypothetically necessary given the an-
tecedent states of the substance.26
25 See Adams 2005.
26 A complication is introduced by the fact that Leibniz accepts some version of divine concurrence 
according to which both God and creatures are causally responsible for what happens in the natural 
world. The concurrentist denies that this shared responsibility can be understood either as overdeter-
mination or as partial causation. The concurrentist denies over determination because if God with-
drew his concurrence, the creatures would not succeed in bringing about changes. The concurrentist 
denies partial causation because God is causally sufficient all by himself. The mystery is what causal 
role remains for creatures? It would appear that there is nothing left over for them to do. Although 
there can be little doubt that Leibniz was committed to concurrentism, there is a great deal of contro-
versy among commentators over the content of Leibniz’s concurrentism, whether or not it is a co-
herent doctrine, and whether or not it creates difficulties for his rejection of occasionalism. I will not 
try to address these interpretative difficulties here. Rather, I will follow the example of Leibniz him-
self, who generally relegates discussions of divine concurrence to theological and moral contexts. 
When he discusses causation in the context of purely metaphysical or natural contexts, he generally 
neglects the topic of divine concurrence. I will do the same.
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Was Leibniz aware that his views on causation and modality entail 
that causal necessity is absolute? There is no direct textual evidence 
that he was, but I believe that there is some indirect evidence. Leibniz’s 
objection to Malebranche’s occasionalism is that it makes God per-
form too many miracles. What is interesting about this objection given 
our present concern is that it never occurs to Leibniz to challenge the 
most substantial premise of the occasionalist’s argument: that if x 
causes y, then it is inconceivable that x exists or occurs and that y does 
not exist or occurs. That is, Leibniz never challenges the occasionalist’s 
assumption that the causal relation is absolutely or logically necessary. 
I am aware of only one text where Leibniz discusses Malebranche’s ar-
gument for occasionalism from the lack of a necessary connection 
between finite things.27 There he calls that argument the strongest argu-
ment for occasionalism and does not directly question the requirement 
that causes absolutely necessitate their effects. I think that the combi-
nation of the systematic grounds that commit Leibniz to the thesis to-
gether with his reluctance to criticize Malebranche for holding it 
amount to compelling evidence that Leibniz was aware of and accepted 
the commitment on some level.
We have seen that Leibniz is committed to holding that causal connec-
tions are absolutely or logically necessary. Can Leibniz respond to the kind 
of pressures that have led many philosophers to deny that causal connec-
tions are absolutely necessary? Recall that many contemporary phi-
losophers deny the absolute necessity of the causal relation because they 
 endorse DEPENDENCE, PROBABILISTIC CAUSATION, or 
CONTINGENT LAWS. And many medieval philosophers deny the 
absolute necessity of the causal relation because they believe MIRACLES.
Let us first consider what Leibniz would make of DEPENDENCE. 
In one sense, causal relations, according to Leibniz, do not depend upon 
background conditions. Nothing external to the substance makes any 
difference to evolution of the substance. If background conditions are 
27 See Robinet 1955, 412.
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factors external to the cause upon which the causal relation depends, 
then there are no background conditions in Leibniz’s world, because 
nothing outside of a substance can influence it. Of course, individual 
modes of a substance may have other modes of the same substance as 
conditions for their causal efficacy. A perception as if of the match 
being struck may only cause a perception as if of the match igniting on 
the condition of a perception as if of oxygen in the atmosphere. But 
Leibniz often speaks of the relata of the causal relation as total states of 
a substance. He says things like, “the present state of each substance is 
a natural result [consequence] of its preceding state” (GP 4:521). What 
is “the state” of a substance? Presumably it is its total state. So the cause 
of the state that includes a representation of a match igniting is a state 
that includes a representation as if of a match being struck and a repre-
sentation as if of oxygen in the immediate atmosphere, etc. So the per-
ception of the striking of the match is a partial cause that only produces 
its effect in conjunction with other partial causes such as the presence 
of oxygen. In this, Leibniz resembles Spinoza. And, presumably, he is 
attracted to the framework of partial and total causes by his commit-
ment to the PSR.
All of the other considerations that push toward a denial of the ab-
solute necessity of causal connections pertain to the laws of nature. We 
will have to inquire into whether or not Leibniz holds that the laws are 
deterministic and necessary and, if he does, whether or not he has 
good reasons for this opinion. The issue of miracles also relates to the 
laws of nature. If miracles can suppress the natural causal power of cre-
ated things then the laws of nature have exceptions. If they have excep-
tions, then they are neither deterministic nor necessary.
Let’s start with MIRACLES because, for many reasons, this is the 
most pressing issue for Leibniz and his response to it will, to some extent, 
control his responses to PROBABILISTIC CAUSATION and CON-
TINGENT LAWS. Christian orthodoxy requires miracles, and Leibniz 
(unlike Spinoza) aspires to such orthodoxy. Indeed, Leibniz affirms that 
“God can exempt creatures from the laws that he prescribed for them, 
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and produce in them that which their nature does not bear by per-
forming a miracle” (T 3). How can this be consistent with Leibniz’s per 
se possibility account of modality, according to which causal connec-
tions are absolutely necessary? The existence of miracles also bears on 
the issue of the modal status of the laws. If there are miraculous excep-
tions to the laws, then the laws are not necessary. Indeed, they are not 
even true universal generalizations. But if they are not necessary, then 
how can the causal connections that they subsume be necessary? In 
order to answer this question, we must look more closely at Leibniz’s 
conception of laws.
Leibniz distinguishes between two types of law: “the universal law 
of the general order” and “subordinate maxims.” The universal law of 
the general order is exceptionless. Even miracles, Leibniz explicitly af-
firms, conform to it. The universal law of the general order, however, is 
beyond the comprehension of any finite mind. The subordinate 
maxims express regularities in nature that are comprehensible to finite 
minds, but they admit of exceptions. For Leibniz, the subordinate 
maxims are laws of nature. Even though miracles conform to the uni-
versal law of the general order, they are violations of the subordinate 
maxims. Since the subordinate maxims are the laws of nature, in this 
sense, miracles are supernatural.
Leibniz relates substantial form or primitive active force to law. As 
Leibniz writes to De Volder, primitive forces are “internal tendencies 
of simple substances, by which according to a certain law of their 
nature they pass from perception to perception” (GP 2:275/AG 181). 
Moreover, the primitive force is not just governed by laws, it may even 
be identified with them: “the primitive force is as it were the law of the 
series” of successive perceptual states (GP 2:262/L 533).
The important question for our purposes is, does Leibniz identify the 
law of the series with the universal law of the general order or with the 
subordinate maxims? If he identifies the law of the series with the univer-
sal law of the general order, then, since they conform to the universal law, 
miracles will be produced by the primitive active force of the substances 
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in which they inhere. Thus, even miracles would be necessitated by the 
states of the substance which precede them, although the law that sub-
sumes them will be incomprehensible to a finite mind. If Leibniz identi-
fies the law of the series with the subordinate maxims, then, since they 
violate the subordinate maxims, miracles will not be produced by the 
primitive active force of the substance in which they inhere.
There is some evidence that suggests that Leibniz identifies primi-
tive active force with the subordinate maxims. For example, he claims 
that “strictly speaking God works a miracle when he does a thing that 
surpasses the forces that he has given to creatures and conserves in 
them” (L 93). Since Leibniz believes that God performs miracles, he 
must also believe that some things surpass the created the forces pos-
sessed by creatures. Every substance expresses everything that happens. 
So, if God performs a miracle, then some states of every creature are 
not produced by the forces contained in them. How can primitive 
active force produce every state of a creature if some of the creature’s 
states are miraculous?
Robert Adams has persuasively argued that Leibniz often expresses 
himself in a misleading fashion when it comes to miracles, and that by 
“forces” and “powers” and “nature” Leibniz means, in the context of 
discussions of miracles, only a portion of a creature’s primitive active 
force.28 Part of Adams’ case rests on the following text:
If we include in our nature everything that it expresses, nothing is 
supernatural to it, for it extends to everything, since an effect always 
expresses its cause and God is the true cause of substances. But as 
that which our nature expresses more perfectly belongs to it in a spe-
cial way, since it is in that that its power consists, and since [its 
power] is limited, as I have just explained, there are plenty of things 
that surpass the forces of our nature, and even those of all limited 
natures. Consequently, in order to speak more clearly, I say that 
28 Adams 1994, 89–94.
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miracles and extraordinary concurrences of God have this peculi-
arity, that they cannot be foreseen by reasoning of any created mind, 
however enlightened it might be, because the distinct comprehen-
sion of the general order surpasses them all.
The account of power and activity that Leibniz is here alluding to is the 
one that he develops in order to “reconcile the language of metaphysics 
with practice,” and it is an account of quasi-causation or the appear-
ance of causation.29 Consequently, it is also an account of quasi-action 
and quasi-power. Leibniz sometimes spells out the view in epistemic 
terms. He writes that a substance is “active insofar what is distinctly 
known in it serves to give a reason for what happens in another, and 
passive insofar as the reason for what happens in it is found in what is 
distinctly known in another” (Mon. 52). So a substance’s power or 
force, in this sense, is a function of what is distinctly known in it. This 
is surely a relative notion. God knows everything distinctly. Only in 
relation to finite minds are some things more distinctly known than 
others. This suggests that what is in a substance’s power is relative to a 
mind. What is in a substance’s power is what a finite mind can infer 
about the substance’s future states from what it can understand of the 
substance. This clearly relates the notion of power or force under dis-
cussion here to the subordinate maxims or laws of nature that finite 
minds can grasp but that have exceptions. A miracle is something that 
cannot be inferred from the nature of any finite substance. A miracle is 
thus something for which there is no explanation simple enough for a 
finite mind to grasp.
On this reading, the primitive active force of a substance is causally 
responsible for all of its states. Finite minds, however, cannot grasp 
29 Due to space limitations, I have not been able to discuss Leibniz’s theory of the preestablished 
harmony in this chapter. On that theory, distinct created substances never causally interact. Instead, 
the appearance of interaction results from the fact that God endows each created substance with a 
primitive active force that is preprogrammed to harmonize with the primitive active force of every 
other created substance so that the appearance of interaction obtains.
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how the primitive active force is responsible. At best, finite minds can 
glean the subordinate maxims that describe the evolution of the sub-
stance, but these maxims do not fully capture the causal powers of sub-
stances. This is why there are exceptions to the subordinate maxims, 
including miraculous ones. Miracles thus do not provide any reason to 
think that causal connections are not absolutely necessary. If the strik-
ing of a match does not ignite it due to God’s miraculous intervention, 
that just means that the subordinate maxims failed to determine the 
match’s state on this occasion. The universal law of the general order 
has not been violated, and the primitive active force of the substances 
involved has not been suppressed.
Let us now consider PROBABILISTIC CAUSATION. Could 
the laws encoded in primitive active force be probabilistic? No. This is 
ruled out by Leibniz’s commitment to the PSR. Just like Spinoza, Leib-
niz thinks that every truth has a sufficient cause or reason. Moreover, 
as Don Rutherford has argued, Leibniz is committed to the claim that 
everything that exists or happens has a sufficient reason in the natural 
order.30 Presumably, the sufficient reasons for natural effects are their 
causes. So, by the PSR, their causes must be sufficient for them. In 
other words, causes absolutely necessitate their effects.
Let us now consider CONTINGENT LAWS. As we saw earlier, 
Leibniz distinguishes between two kinds of law: the universal law of 
the general order and subordinate maxims, which Leibniz identifies 
with the laws of nature. We have also seen that there are good reasons 
to suppose that Leibniz thinks that the law that determines causal rela-
tions is the universal law of the general order and not the subordinate 
maxims or laws of nature. The subordinate maxims do not really deter-
mine causal relations. They merely provide simple explanations such 
that finite minds can grasp. The true engine of change in the world is 
30 Rutherford 1992. Rutherford thinks that what he calls the Principle of Intelligibility, that every 
thing in nature has a natural cause is stronger than the PSR. This is obviously correct, but I think that 
its place in Leibniz’s system derives from the PSR in conjunction with assumptions about the divine 
nature.
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the universal law of the general order or, what is the same thing, the 
primitive active force of substances.
The universal law of the general order could have been different. 
Since the universal law of the general order is the law of the series or the 
primitive active force of substances, if there had been different sub-
stances then there would likely have been different laws.31 But what is 
impossible is that there are all the same substances but different laws.32 
The laws, as Leibniz understands them, are not, as some contemporary 
philosophers are inclined to think of them, independent of the sub-
stances which they govern. They cannot be varied independently of the 
substances. If the laws were different, then the substances would have 
been different. This being so, the contingency of the laws does not 
threaten the absolute necessity of causal connections. It is not true that 
if the laws had been different, then the striking of the match would not 
have caused its ignition. There is no possible world in which the rele-
vant laws are different and yet the match is still struck. No world in 
which the relevant laws are different includes the match in question.
3. Conclusion
We have looked at Spinoza and Leibniz’s commitment to the claim that 
causal connections are absolutely necessary. We have also looked at the 
reasons that might have motivated these philosophers to hold this 
opinion. In the case of Leibniz, we saw that this opinion was entailed 
by larger systematic commitments. In the case of Spinoza, although he ex-
plicitly endorses the absolute necessity of causal relations, larger system-
atic considerations that support it are difficult to identify. The closest 
we came to deriving it from one of Spinoza’s most basic philosophical 
31 If the universal law of the general order supervenes on the primitive active force of substances, then 
it is possible that the substances differ without the laws differing due to the possibility that the general 
law might be multiply realizable. Whether or not this is the case will depend on details that we are not 
in a position to know.
32 See Adams 1994, 80.
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commitments was the argument that we considered from the PSR. But 
Spinoza never offers such an argument, and so any such interpretation 
remains speculative. This is, of itself, disappointing, but my results have 
been disappointing in other respects as well. Earlier we noted that many 
early modern philosophers believe that causal connections are abso-
lutely necessary, but remarked that it is mysterious that this belief is so 
widespread. My findings in this chapter do little to solve this mystery. 
Perhaps Spinoza was led by his commitment to the PSR to believe that 
causal connections are absolutely necessary, but Hobbes, Descartes, and 
Malebranche do not share Spinoza’s enthusiasm for the PSR and so, 
even if such a consideration did motivate Spinoza, it does not explain 
the prevalence of this conception of causation in the seventeenth cen-
tury. And we saw that Leibniz was committed to the absolute necessity 
of causal connections by his rehabilitation of substantial form as primi-
tive active force and his per se possibility analysis of necessity. But these 
doctrines are innovations introduced by Leibniz, not common currency 
in the early modern period. As such they shed little light on this ques-
tion. The larger mystery remains unsolved.33
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